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Source: *The Journal of Race Development*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Jan., 1918), pp. 296-317

Published by:

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/29738242>

Accessed: 01-08-2014 01:32 UTC

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## BULGARIA'S CASE

*By Radoslav Andrea Tsanoff, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, The Rice Institute, Houston, Texas*

It cannot be too often repeated that, whatever its ultimate developments and results may yet be, the European war is initially, essentially, and immediately a Balkan conflict, a conflict for eastern Mediterranean, Balkan-Anatolian dominion. The submarine menace, sinister though it may appear while it lasts, is obviously a menace of the moment only, for not even Germany may contemplate the permanent lack of a counterweapon. But the collapse of Entente diplomacy and arms in the Balkans appears on the surface as a distinctive and permanent German victory, and, on that account, as a graver menace to democracy. The democratic resurrection of Russia and her consequent military demise make unlikely the interruption of the Hamburg-Constantinople schedules from the north; Sarraill's army promises little from the south; and, as long as the trains run from Hamburg to Constantinople, it is reasoned, nothing short of a complete German disaster in the West can alter the fact that the Hohenzollerns stand today facing the world, undefeated.

To realize the radical fallacy of the last of these three assertions is one of the important tasks confronting the American mind today. The false premise involves a blunder which has already proved costly to the Entente, and which America should not repeat. This is the blunder of treating Bulgaria as a smaller Turkey, more energetic perhaps, but none the less subservient to Berlin, a Hohenzollern pawn, one with Germany in spirit and an outpost of Germany in fact. The evidence of this utter failure to understand Bulgaria's spirit and to estimate the true significance of her recent victories on the field of battle is not limited to the deliverances of the omniscient journalist: university pro-

fessors and ex-ambassadors have been painting learned maps of the growth of Democracy, in which they slap the autocratic Prussian black across Bulgaria.

The truth is, Bulgaria entered the war as an ally of Germany, not because she sympathized with Prussianism, but because German strategy had to admit what Entente strategy apparently did not admit: the demands of Bulgaria's own liberating mission. Although the Entente has spent blood and money fighting against Bulgaria, Bulgaria has not been fighting against the Entente, nor has she been fighting Germany's battles. Bulgaria's war is a Bulgarian war pure and simple, a distinctively Balkan undertaking, aiming to complete the liberation and the unification of the Bulgarian folk—a work bloodily begun in 1876, partially done and undone in 1877–78, continued in 1885–86, 1912, 1913, and now all but completed. The diplomacy of Sir Edward Grey and his colleagues is alone to blame if Bulgaria's victory of liberation is not militarily an Entente asset. And in Grey's steps America would continue if she did not openly recognize the undeniable fact that Bulgaria has already achieved in the heart of the Balkans that which America is now undertaking to achieve for all Europe: the vindication of the principles of nationality and democracy.

If the Balkan regions claimed by Bulgaria and held by Bulgar troops today are regions inhabited by Bulgars; if the cultural ideals inspiring Bulgaria, and her political and economic system, are genuinely democratic; if the ethnic unification and the strengthening of Bulgaria are in no sense a triumph of *Drang nach Osten* diplomacy—then America should realize and should openly declare, not only that she has no possible quarrel with Bulgaria, but that the active support of Bulgaria's demands is a logical part of her own war-program. It is the purpose of this article to point out the truth of these three suppositions and thus to validate the assertions made in the preceding paragraph.

He who has crossed swords with Prussian militarism need not oppose Bulgaria, so long as Bulgaria's alliance with Germany does not imply her subservience to the policies of Prussian militarism or her adoption of its ideals. He who opposes

German rule in Alsace-Lorraine on the ground that the German is there an intruding alien, may well champion Bulgar rule in Macedonia, if the Macedonian natives are Bulgar. He who prepares to spill his blood to save Belgium from the clutches of a hated autocracy may and should uphold Bulgaria's territorial demands, if those demands assure the inhabitants of the territory in question of a truly democratic government and of the very liberty for which they have been spilling their own blood for over half a century. The whole problem, as far as it touches Bulgaria, reduces itself to this: Are the lands which Bulgaria occupies and claims today lands ethnically Bulgar? Is the government which Bulgaria aims to establish there a truly democratic government? Is Bulgaria consciously or unconsciously a pawn in Germany's hands, or is she battling to realize her own independent destiny?

## I

During the long centuries of Mohammedan oppression the Greek Patriarchate and clergy used their ecclesiastic authority over the Bulgarian church in a tireless effort to Hellenize the Bulgar population in the Balkans and to efface the Bulgarian language. When one considers the Bulgarian names of dozens of villages in regions which today are exclusively Greek, as in Chalcidice and Kojani (Izvor, Golemo-Vantcha, Ventzi, Lukovo, Toplik, Vurbovo, etc.), and when one fails to find today the Bulgars mentioned in the memoirs of early travelers through some districts in southern Macedonia and along the Aegean coast, one begins to realize the sinister effects of this age-long Greek spiritual oppression over the Bulgar race. But the ethnic obstinacy of the Bulgar is shown in the fact that after half-a-thousand years of such efforts at Hellenizing, the mass of the native population of Macedonia still calls itself Bulgar and speaks the Bulgarian language.

In the year 1805, Pouqueville, arriving in the Lake Kastoria region on his way from Greece, found the peasants speaking Bulgarian, and since that time European and Ameri-

can ethnographers, historians, travellers and missionaries and philologists have agreed in recognizing the Macedonian native as a Bulgar. An exhaustive digest of this unanimous evidence would fill an impressively monotonous volume; only a brief statement is possible here. That this brief statement is typical, the reader may convince himself by consulting the authorities cited and named, or by perusing the longer array of evidence collected in such works as D. M. Brancoff's *La Macédoine et sa population chrétienne* (Paris, Librairie Plon, 1905), which is utilized here, or H. N. Brailsford's *Macedonia, Its Races and Their Future* (London, Methuen, 1906). An able pamphlet recently published in this country, entitled *Bulgaria and Her Neighbors*, contains enough ethnographic and historical evidence touching the point to convince anyone still open to conviction.

Ami Boué (1840), Cyprien Robert (1844), Grigorovitch (1844), Lejean (1861), and Synvet (1872) agree in finding the southern boundary line of ethnic Bulgaria along a line running from Ochrida to Salonica. Konstantin Irecek (1878), an authority of the very first rank on Balkan history and ethnography, draws the same line more precisely: Ochrida, Prespa, Kastoria, Niausta, Salonica, Serres, Drama, Demotica, Uzun-Keupru, Bunar-Hissar, Little Samokov, the Black Sea. Sir Edwin Pears writes: "Away from the shore it is rare to find a purely Greek village except near the confines of Greece," and Arthur J. Evans found the Bulgarian element predominating the entire length and breadth of Macedonia and declared that a traveler can cross the whole of Macedonia, from Mt. Pindus to the old Bulgarian frontier, without encountering a single Greek.

In 1877 Teploff published a comparative table of the Christian population of Macedonia. In 26 of the 46 Macedonian kazas Teploff found 940,000 Bulgars and 2616 Greeks. Rittich's statistics published in St. Petersburg in 1885, pointed out that Macedonia had 59,833 Greeks against 1,121,288 Bulgars. Gaston Routier in 1903 estimated the Greeks in Macedonia to be 322,000 as compared with 1,136,000 Bulgars. According to Turkish statistics, published in *Le Temps* in 1905, there are in Mace-

donia 270,000 Greeks against 1,210,000 Bulgars. The same view is taken by the standard works of reference. Meyer's *Grosses Konversations-Lexikon* finds, on the basis of Peucker's statistics, 240,000 Greeks in Macedonia against 1,355,000 Slavs. *La Grande Encyclopédie* states that the Greeks in Macedonia number 266,000, against 1,000,000 Slavs. The Bulgarian nationality of these Slavs, it points out, "has been accepted by all travellers and ethnographers." In the eleventh edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, J. D. Bouchier, the veteran Balkan correspondent of the *London Times* writes: "The whole Slavonic population of Macedonia may be estimated at about 1,150,000 . . . the majority of these own allegiance to the Bulgarian Exarchate, but a certain minority still remain faithful to the Greek Patriarchate. . . . All independent authorities agree that the bulk of the Slavonic population in Macedonia is Bulgarian." The *Britannica* estimates the Greek element in Macedonia at a quarter of a million. These figures clearly illustrate the truth of Sir Edwin Pears' statement that, while Macedonian statistics are untrustworthy, the one factor which is pretty certain is that the Bulgars are the largest element.

This is the unanimous statement of European and American experts who have allowed the Macedonian native to speak for himself. I do not know of a single competent European or American writer on the Balkans who does not recognize the ethnic predominance of the Bulgar in Macedonia. But to the evidence cited above might be added that of Ubicini, Hilferding, Leake, Kanitz, Tozer, Lamouche, Edmund Spencer, Schafarik, and Leon Dominian's recent book on *Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe*, published by the American Geographical Society. Brancoff points for further similar evidence to Hahn, Griesebach, Heuschling, Mackenzie and Irby, Roberts, Patermann, Muller, Dumont, Florinsky, Golubintzki, Obroutcheff, Makoucheff, Boudilovitch, Stein, Kolb, Circou, Bouch, Weigand, Milukoff, Bérard, Choublier, Bashmakoff. Not one of these authorities is a Bulgar.

To be sure, the Greek statistics of Macedonia tell an

amazingly original story, quite different from any non-Greek account; for Greek census-makers have shown an irresistible desire to count as Greek all the inhabitants of Macedonia who have not severed their religious bonds with the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople, be they Bulgars of Vlakhs or Albanians by nationality and language. But the Hellenistic pronunciamientos of Phanar can no more make Greeks of the Bulgars of Macedonia than a pontifical bull can Italianize the Catholic Irishman of Cork.

According to Brancoff's statistics, Macedonia has 190,047 Greeks against 1,172,136 Bulgars, of whom 897,160 recognize the religious authority of the Bulgarian Exarch, 269,641 have not yet freed themselves from the ecclesiastic dominion of the Greek Patriarchate, 515 are in the monasteries of the Mt. Athos peninsula, 2432 are Catholics, and 2338 are Protestants. Brancoff's figures do not include the Mohammedan Bulgars (Pomaks), some 100,000 in number. A comparison of Brancoff's general statistical conclusions with those quoted above will establish their reliability. In turning to consider very briefly the ethnic complexion of the particular districts in Macedonia, I shall use Brancoff's census, as it is most explicit and detailed, covering the nationality, religious allegiance and school-statistics of the Christian population in every particular district, town, village and hamlet throughout Macedonia.

The Greek population of Macedonia is confined to the southern regions, yet even here in some districts the Bulgars are in the majority. Thus the *kaza* of Lerin (Florina) has 43,488 Bulgars and 110 Greeks; in the *kaza* of Ochrid, with 44,432 Bulgars, there are 3084 Vlakhs, but no Greeks whatever; the *kaza* of Vodena has several hundred Gypsies alongside its 31,136 Bulgars, but no Greeks. And, if in the town of Kastoria the 4000 Greeks outnumber the Bulgars ten to one, the entire village population is Bulgar, and the *kaza* of Kastoria has 57,400 Bulgars against 11,075 Greeks. The city of Salonica, with a total population of 130,000, has 20,000 Greeks and 8,000 Bulgars. But while in the city of Salonica the Greeks, comprising one-sixth of the population, out-number the Bulgars more than two to one,



in the kaza of Salonica outside the city the Bulgars number 25,120, and the Greeks 17,265.

East of Salonica the Aegean coast is more Greek than Bulgar in its urban population; but, again, while in the town of Serres there are 2488 Bulgars against 5105 Greeks, in the kaza of Serres there are 47,560 Bulgars to 28,543 Greeks, and in the whole sanjak of Serres 259,186 Bulgars to 50,298 Greeks. Indeed the town of Serres is a Hellenized island in a Bulgarian sea. The town of Drama also has 432 Bulgars, 700 Greeks, and 1500 Vlakhs, but the kaza of Drama numbers 11,016 Bulgars, 3890 Greeks, and 1914 Vlakhs. That is to say, even in those districts of Macedonia where Greeks are to be found at all,—north of Thessaly and along the Aegean coast—they are mainly town merchants or else nomadic fisherfolk, while the native population, tilling the soil and christening village and mountain and river and forest, is Bulgar.

Of course only along the Aegean coast do the Greeks exceed the Bulgars in the towns. The Bulgar town population all over Macedonia is 214,260 against 52,080 Greeks, of whom 20,000 are in Salonica.

Leaving out of account the three mainly Turkish kazas of Pravisht, Kavala, and Sarichaban, we find in Macedonia only two exclusively Greek kazas, Kassandra and Kojani, with a Greek population of 30,145. Three kazas (Karferia, Nasselitch, and Athos) are mainly Greek: 34,194 Greeks, 9924 Bulgars. One, Salonica, has 33,120 Bulgars against 37,265 Greeks. But, in fifteen kazas the Bulgars predominate (Ochrida, Monastir, Florina, Kailiari, Kastoria, Dolna-Reka, Petrich, Demir-Hissar, Vodena, Melnik, Ghevgheli, Lagadina, Serres, Zihna, and Drama), with 76,668 Greeks against 512,426 Bulgars. The remaining twenty-two kazas of Macedonia are purely Bulgar (Kukush, Doiran, Enidje-Vardar, Tikvesh, Strumitsa, Razlog, Gorna-Djumaia, Nevrokop, Uskub, Veles, Tetovo, Kumanovo, Kratovo, Kotchana, Shtip, Radovish, Prechovo, Egri-Palanka, Prilep, Pehtchevo, Dibra, Kitchevo): 390 Greeks, 616,046 Bulgars.

A survey of the last two lists of kazas shows them to



include that part of Macedonia which the Serbs occupied as a result of the Balkan wars and which they held until the fall of 1915. The question naturally arises: are there, then, no Serbs in Macedonia? The true answer is a plain "No." There are Serb schools in Macedonia, there is a Serb propaganda in Macedonia, there is a Serb campaign in Entente capitals for Macedonia, but in Macedonia there are no native Serbs. When false absurdities have been circulated widely in the press of two continents for several years, a statement of the bare facts may appear dogmatic, as the above unqualified negative doubtless will appear to some readers. The Bulgar native, recognizing in the Greek his traditional enemy in Macedonia, has entrenched himself to maintain his case against the Panhellenic propaganda. To prove the baselessness of Serb claims in Macedonia has appeared superfluous to the Bulgar, so obvious is that baselessness. But, what the Bulgar has not done, European writers, and Serb writers themselves, have abundantly established.

What, in distinction from political boundaries and boundaries of military occupation, is the ethnic line separating Serb from Bulgar? Lejean (1861) and Synvet (1872) draw a line from Timok through Nish to Prizrend and so on to Ochrida. Irecek (1878), more in detail, draws the north-west boundary of ethnic Bulgaria thus: Timok, Prokopie (southwest of Nish), the heights on the left of the Morava valley, Vrania, Tchern-Gora, Shar Mountain, Dibra, eastern shore of Lake Ochrida. Emile de Laveleye (1888) demonstrates the racially Bulgar character of the territory of the region east of Prizrend, the River Drin, and Lake Ochrida, and cites the conclusion of "the best informed writers," Reclus, Kiepert, Ubcini, Lejean, Crousse, that the great majority of the inhabitants of Macedonia are Bulgars. So likewise testify Edmund Spencer, Evans, Jagitch, Niederle, René Pinon, and a score of Western European and Russian authorities, who agree in regarding the natives of Macedonia as Bulgars.

The map of Bulgaria drawn by the Conference of Constantinople in 1876-77 is especially significant at the present

time, when one is so likely to forget that the regions wrested by Bulgaria from Serbia, Rumania and Greece have been ruled by those countries scarcely over a generation, and in the case of "Serb" Macedonia, scarcely two years. The map of the Conference of Constantinople finds the Western boundary-line of the Bulgarian folk where competent ethnographers before and since have found it, on the Timok-Nish Ochrida line. In answer to Benigsen's interpellation in the Reichstag, Bismarck, for whom all Bulgaria was not worth one Pomeranian grenadier and who opposed Bulgaria's cause at the Berlin Congress, recognized the Bulgarian nationality of the Macedonian native and admitted, ethnographically speaking, the great Bulgaria of the Conference of Constantinople and the Treaty of San Stefano.

And, what is perhaps more conclusive in this connection, the Serbs themselves held a similar view prior to the Berlin Congress days. The old Serb writers properly regard the Timok-Shar Mountain line as the southern boundary of their homeland. Vuk Karadjitch (1814), rightly honored by the Serbs as their cultural saint, regarded the language of the Macedonians as Bulgarian. Stefan Verkovitch the folklorist published in 1860 a volume of 335 songs under the title *Popular Songs of the Macedonian Bulgarians*. In the preface, written in Serbian, he says, in regard to his calling the ballads Bulgarian: "I have called these ballads Bulgarian and not Slavic because today if you should ask any Macedonian Slav, 'What are you?' he would at once reply, 'I am a Bulgarian,' and their language they call Bulgarian." To quote further from the pamphlet *Bulgaria and Her Neighbors*, referred to above, in which other similar evidence is cited: "Verkovitch nowhere in his introduction speaks of or even mentions any Serbians in Macedonia, and this omission occurs in a book issued at the expense of the Serbian Literary Society, printed at Belgrade, in the state printing office, dedicated to the wife of the then reigning prince of Serbia, and published by a Serbian in A. D. 1860, when there was no Serbo-Bulgarian dispute about Macedonia, and fully ten or twelve years before the existence of any Bulgarian Exarchate!" And six years before Serbia

acquired Nish, the wife of the later Serb minister to England, Mme. Mijatovitch, in her *History of Modern Serbia*, described the Nish revolt of 1842 as a rebellion of Bulgarian peasants.

The Serb propaganda in Macedonia followed Austria's expansion into the Serb provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the consequent closing of the Adriatic to Serbia. Just as the Patriarchate of Constantinople has tried to make the world believe that the Bulgars in Macedonia are "Bulgar-speaking Greeks," so the Serb has tried to create Serbs in Macedonia, but to no avail. The 3612 pupils attending the 135 Serb schools in Macedonia in 1905 had to be taught to speak the Serb language; their Bulgar names required the addition of the suffix *itch* to give them the Serb appearance; they had Serb teachers, but Bulgar fathers and mothers. Against all impartial, competent evidence, Serb writers have tried to distort the facts and to convince the world into believing a palpable lie. Typical of the adaptability of Serb ethnographic scholarship to the demands of Serb political and military leaders is the recorded shamelessness of Professor Cvijic pointed out by the professors of the University of Sofia. In his map published in October, 1912, he recognized the Bulgar character of Western Macedonia, with the exception of the Uskub districts; but, when Serbia finally decided to violate her treaty with Bulgaria, Cvijic published another article and map in March 1913, in which he marked as Serb the regions of Egri-Palanka, Kratovo, Ovtche-Polie, Prilep, and Krushevo, which he had recognized five months earlier as Bulgarian, while the greater part of the rest of Macedonia he indicated until further notice, as a "neutral nationality," designated "Macedonian Slavs." By such evidence and by such methods would Pashitch and Peter Karageorgevitch support their pleas before European diplomats and American newspaper correspondents for the restoration of the Serb regime in Macedonia.

Reducing to round numbers the ethnographic statistics, even consenting to count as "Serbs" the Bulgar-speaking Macedonians who have been attracted by the Serb prop-

aganda, we find in Macedonia about 1,120,000 Christian and 100,000 Mohammedan Bulgars, less than 200,000 Greeks and about 53,000 "Serbs." That is, for every Serb proselyte in Macedonia there are four Greeks and twenty-five Bulgars. The Bulgars form over half of the entire population and over 80 per cent of the Christian population; they comprise the bulk of the population in 37 of the 46 kazas, in 36 of the 53 towns, and in 2239 of the 2704 villages of Macedonia.

Ever since the Berlin Congress undid the work of the Treaty of San Stefano, moreover, the native Bulgarian population has fought for the liberty of Macedonia and, even before the Balkan wars, had sacrificed some 20,000 lives to achieve that end. The Macedonian revolutionary movement and indeed the whole cultural life of Macedonia found their support and their inspiration in free Bulgaria. Bulgaria became also the asylum of the thousands of refugees from Macedonian massacres and the nest of the free spirits who found Turkish tyranny intolerable. At the same time when Serbs were proclaiming to the world the "liberation" of their Macedonian "brothers," four portfolios in the Bulgarian cabinet were held by Macedonians, as well as several chairs in the University of Sofia. The Bulgar educational system in Macedonia is a native product and not the result of a proselytizing propaganda. In 1902, out of a total of 1239 professors and teachers in the Bulgar schools of Macedonia, 1220 were natives Macedonians and 4 were foreigners; and, to match the 15 Bulgarian-born Bulgars teaching in Macedonia, there were 450 Macedonian Bulgars teaching in the schools of free Bulgaria. Macedonians abound in all the professions and are among the leading business men of Bulgaria. The Bulgarian army includes thousands of Macedonians, soldiers and officers. A Macedonian, General Boyadjieff, was Bulgarian Minister of War during the campaign of 1915. Who are the prominent Macedonian "Serbs" living in Serbia?

I have risked becoming tedious at the very beginning, perhaps, by referring to even so small a fraction of the evidence available; but everything depends on the reader's

understanding clearly that, whatever may be the political or diplomatic status of the regions held by the Bulgar troops today, ethnically they have been and are unquestionably Bulgarian. Unredeemed Hellas is in the Aegean islands and in Anatolian spots. The Serb homeland is even vaster; Pypin and Spasovitch (1879) assign to the Serbs Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Dalmatia, part of Istria, Slavonia, Syrmia, Batchka, Banat, etc. All this let Serbia have, if she can get it, the Bulgar people declare, but "Macedonia is ours." The combined evidence of ethnographer and statesman, traveller and folklorist is supported by the evidence of a body of American missionaries, who testified in 1913 publicly that for over fifty years they have worked in town and village and hamlet throughout Macedonia, and that their work has been done in Bulgarian, for the simple reason that the Macedonian speaks Bulgarian and calls himself a Bulgar. This is the truth: the regions which the Bulgar troops hold today and to which Bulgaria lays permanent claim, are regions inhabited by Bulgars. Bulgaria does not covet the property of others, but she insists on having her own.

## II

The regions held and claimed by Bulgaria are Bulgar-inhabited regions: on the principle of nationality, they should remain Bulgarian. What sort of government, however, would Bulgaria establish in them, were she to retain them permanently? Would an ethnically unified and strengthened Bulgaria further or thwart the cause of Democracy for which so much blood is being spilled today?

Bulgaria's answer is her own record. Some forty years ago Bulgaria, a political and economic corpse just returned to life, rose from the decay of Ottoman tyranny to attack the thousand and one problems of constitutional government. Her leaders were young idealists who had caught the spirit of French republicanism and had been taught at Robert College and elsewhere the ideals of American democracy; but the mass of her people bore the look that only five cen-

turies of Moslem oppression can imprint on the physiognomy of a race. There were cautious sages in Bulgaria who shook their conservative heads and counselled the not-too-rapid modernization of the country; there were liberals, radicals; there were red-shirts and firebrands. Only the native stability of the Bulgarian folk saved it from internal chaos and outside intervention. Russia's ever-present emissaries could not prevent young Bulgaria from adopting the sort of constitution for the sake of which she had fought against the Turk—a constitution guaranteeing universal suffrage, freedom of speech, press, and public assembly, and religious liberty. This constitution Bulgaria has maintained and has developed. Bulgaria has no nobility or caste system of any sort. Every Bulgar citizen votes on the same basis as every other; the National Assembly is unicameral, and the members of the cabinet are responsible to it. The Bulgarian electoral system, designed to insure the proportional representation of minorities, is a recent step ahead in democracy, which few of the nations now battling to save democracy have attempted to take. The character of this system should be of interest to advocates of truly representative government as well as to those who would acquaint themselves with Bulgaria's political life.

In order to minimize the exercise of official pressure at the polls, the Bulgarian law compels all candidates for the National Assembly holding public office to resign their positions. Exception is made only of cabinet members, whose portfolios cannot be left vacant, and whose tenure of office is itself presumably subject to the verdict of the elections. Bulgaria anticipates the dangers of clericalism and army rule by excluding all priests and militaries from her legislature. She seeks to check graft by making it impossible for a contractor of any sort to sit in the Assembly. She discourages the subordination of national to local interests by allowing any eligible citizen to place his candidacy in any district. She encourages independent voting by admitting any eligible citizen to candidacy on the signed petition of ten registered voters. And she assures the proportional representation of minorities. The Bulgarian



voter is assured of being represented in the National Assembly even if he does not choose to vote the ticket of the strongest individual party.

An electoral system based on the principle of plurality makes the relative predominance of a party at the polls an absolute predominance, since it delivers the total representation of the district to the party receiving the largest number, but not necessarily all, or even the majority, of the votes cast. This system virtually deprives the several individually weaker minorities of representation, depriving the country also of their direct contribution to its legislation.

To illustrate. If a section of a country sends ten representatives to its parliament, and the election results show that 40 per cent of the voters have voted the ticket of one party, 30 per cent the ticket of another, 20 per cent a third ticket, and 10 per cent a fourth,—then, if that country has an electoral system based on the principle of plurality, all the ten candidates of the first-named party will be declared elected, while the other three parties, individually weaker, but collectively representing the majority of the voting population, will have no representation whatever. In Bulgaria, under such conditions, this section will be represented by four candidates of the first-named party, three candidates of the second, two of the third, and one of the fourth. It is clear, then, that a member in the Bulgarian National Assembly does not hold his mandate because he polled more votes than any individual one of his rivals in the particular district which he represents and whose local interests he is expected to further. He is a “congressman at large,” and the partisan complexion of each district’s representation in the National Assembly repeats with almost mathematical accuracy the partisan complexion of the voters in that district. The Bulgarian citizen has no fear of “throwing away his vote,” and therefore can vote as his political convictions urge him.

This is the sort of government which Bulgaria is establishing in Macedonia. But what government was Macedonia vouchsafed by her Serb “liberators?” Behold the Serb “Decree for Public Security,” adopted on October 4,



1913, setting forth the manner in which Pashitch and Peter Karageorgevitch governed the natives of Macedonia whom they have been proclaiming to the world as “veritable Serbs?” The translation is that quoted in the Balkan Report of the International Carnegie Commission:

Any person who uses an explosive *without any evil intention*, shall be punished by five years’ penal servitude (Article 11). Any attempt at rebellion against the public powers is punishable by five years’ penal servitude. The decision of the police authorities, published in the respective communes, is sufficient proof of the commission of crime. If the rebel refuses to give himself up as prisoner within ten days from such publication, he may be put to death by any public or military officer (Article 2). Any person accused of rebellion in terms of the police decision and who commits any crime shall be punished with death. If the accused person himself gives himself up as a prisoner into the hands of the authorities, the death penalty shall be commuted to penal servitude for ten or twenty years, always provided that the commutation is approved by the tribunal (Article 3).

The Macedonian natives under Serb rule are vicariously punishable, Chinese fashion, for the offenses of others. Thus,

Where several cases of rebellion occur in a commune and the rebels do not return to their homes within ten days from the police notice, the authorities have the right of deporting their families whithersoever they may find convenient. Likewise the inhabitants of the houses in which armed persons or criminals in general are found concealed, shall be deported. The heads of the police shall transmit to the Prefecture a report of the deportation procedure, which is to be put in force immediately. The Minister of the Interior shall, if he think desirable, rescind deportation measures (Article 4).

The Macedonian Bulgars are required to be spies under penalty of the law.

Anyone who knows a malefactor and does not denounce him to the authorities shall be punished by five years’ penal servitude (Article 16).

And finally, by Article 26

The Prefects have the right to prescribe in their name police measures to safeguard the life and property of those subject to their administration. They shall fix penalties applicable to

those who refuse to submit to such measures. The penalty shall consist of a maximum period of three years' imprisonment or a pecuniary fine up to a thousand *dinars* (francs). The edicts of the Prefects shall come into force immediately, but the Prefects are bound to communicate them at once to the Minister of the Interior.

Democracy is not a matter merely of parliaments and ballot-boxes: it enters into a nation's economic system and the conditions under which it has to meet the problems of life and livelihood. Bulgaria is a land of small independent farmers without nobility or landed gentry; she has neither the private wealth nor the poverty of Western Europe and America. The following statistics, stated for the sake of convenience in round numbers, are based on the Bulgarian official reports for 1905 and 1908, and should serve to indicate the economic and general cultural conditions under which the Bulgar lives.

Three-fourths of the Bulgarian population live on farms, and of the 900,000 men actually engaged in tilling the soil, barely 80,000 are mere laborers. Bulgaria has no landless drudges; neither does she have any idle rich. Of her population of 4,000,000, only 25,000 belong to the class of rentiers, pensioners and families living on their incomes. Bulgaria has no tenement problem. The 700,000 Bulgar households live in 500,000 houses: one house to every eight inhabitants. Excluding the land owned by the state, by the local communes, school and church land, Bulgaria has 46,000,000 decares, or (roughly) 11,000,000 acres, of cultivated or otherwise exploited land, belonging to over 900,000 persons. Of a total population of 4,000,000 men, women, and children, 900,000 own land. But the distribution of this land is even more significant. Ten of these eleven million acres (41,000,000 of the 46,000,000 decares) are divided into estates of less than 100 acres each, and over two-thirds of these petty landowners live on the ground they own. The absentee landlord is absent from Bulgaria. Less than 1 per cent of Bulgaria's landowners possess estates larger than 100 acres; about 45 per cent own less than five acres; about 55 per cent own from 5 to 100 acres. 900,000 landowners

in 700,000 households living in 500,000 dwellings, and all but one in 160 working for their living: which one of the mighty nations now bleeding the world white to make it safe for Democracy is itself living a life as normal and economically as democratic as the life of the Bulgarian people?

Comparisons are proverbially odious; I am fully aware that great nations are confronted with problems which a small agricultural people like Bulgaria does not have to face; nor would I for a moment compare the total culture of Bulgaria with that of the Western nations. Bulgaria is a small, humble nation whose life of modern culture is not half a century old. But is not a moment's impartial thinking sufficient to show that, in view of the above facts, neither the landless English soldier nor even the soldier of the United States need lose any valuable blood to make Bulgaria democratic?

The Bulgar lives a normal family life. The growth of the population is higher than in any other European country but Russia. Domestic morality is more than a word in Bulgaria. Infant mortality statistics show that of the 28,718 children who died in Bulgaria in one year and who were less than one year old, only 136, or one in 211, were illegitimate. The corresponding figures for Italy are one in 14, for France one in 7. I have no statistics for all of Great Britain, but for Edinburgh the figures are one in 8. The Bulgarian army in 1909 had 19,831 soldiers on the sick list; of these, only 476, representing less than 1 per cent of the total number of soldiers in that year, suffered from venereal diseases. It should be remembered in this connection that Bulgaria's 4,000,000 inhabitants in 1905 included 2407 centenarians and only 6366 mental defectives. A comparison of these figures with those for other countries will prove enlightening to the reader.

From 1887 to 1912 Bulgaria's railroad mileage increased ninefold; her postal service, twentyfold; her telegraph lines trebled; her imports doubled; her exports quadrupled; for every ship that entered and cleared her ports in 1887 there were thirty ships in 1912. I have elsewhere discussed Bulgaria's educational record (see "Bulgaria's Rôle in the

Balkans'' in the *Journal of Race Development*, January, 1915). Less than forty years ago with no schools and with universal illiteracy, the Bulgar has today the best educational system in southeastern Europe: one-tenth of his people attend primary or secondary schools. He educates his women far better than do his neighbors: girls and young women comprise 37.5 per cent of the pupils in the primary, 32.6 per cent in the secondary schools, and 22.2 per cent of the students in the University of Sofia. Bulgaria contributes as many names to the *International Who's Who in Science* as all her Balkan neighbors put together.

The energetic democracy characterizing Bulgaria's education and her economic and political life finds also a clear expression in her racial and political tolerance. The 250,000 Jews in Rumania are without political and social rights. Religious freedom is a dead letter in the land of Bulgaria's neighbors. Protestant missionary work is outlawed in Serbia, and it will be recalled that old Queen Olga precipitated a riot in Athens, which endangered her dynasty, when she circulated the New Testament in modern Greek among the soldiers in the war of 1897. In Bulgaria the Jew is a citizen in regular standing and can hold public office; Moslems are, and Protestants have been, members of the Sofia National Assembly.

These easily verifiable facts prove (what is indeed a commonplace to all who have taken the trouble to inquire) that Bulgaria, a land of small farmers, with constitutional government, universal suffrage, unicameral National Assembly, a truly representative electoral system, compulsory free public education, complete religious liberty, no nobility or caste system, no landed gentry, no private wealth and no poverty in the Western European or American sense of the term, public ownership of railroads, telegraphs, telephones, and other public utilities, is economically and culturally, as well as politically, a genuine democracy.

### III

On the basis of the principles of Nationality and Democracy Bulgaria's case is unassailable. And Bulgaria's enemies

realize the solidity of her position; they recall that Entente and *Dreibund* alike have pronounced her Macedonian claims valid (an important fact which should be borne in mind); they realize the futility of denying the facts which demonstrate the fundamentally democratic character of Bulgaria's whole cultural life, political, economic, social. It is this poverty of solid argument, coupled perhaps with a keen appreciation of what Bulgaria's Balkan victories have meant in a military-strategical sense, which is responsible for the wealth of abuse and invective so characteristic of some recent attacks on Bulgaria and her Tsar in certain Entente journals. One reads of "perfidy" and "selling to the highest bidder," of "sly fox Coburger," "dour, pushing race;" and always the beginning and the end proclaim what the middle seeks to prove—that Bulgaria has sold herself, body and soul, to Prussia, that she is a Hohenzollern pawn and an outpost of *Mittleuropa*, that her army and government are Teutonized beyond recall, that the freedom of Europe demands the humbling of Bulgaria.

Here mere assertion is as futile as mere denial. A few sober considerations, and the actual evidence on hand, should suffice. Grant that Germany's war-aims involve the spread of aggressive autocracy and militarism, the subjugation of other nationalities, and the suppression of democratic institutions,—what is it that commits Bulgaria to any such program? It cannot be her own past record, as the above analysis of her national life proves. Nor can Bulgaria be committed to Pan-Germanism because of any special popularity which the German people and German Kultur enjoy *over* other Western European nations. There is scarcely a city in all Bulgaria that does not have a monument to something Russian, and the finest statue in the land, facing the National Assembly, is of the Czar Liberator, Alexander II. Gladstone is a saint in Bulgaria—a position which neither Bismarck and Andrassy nor their successors have ever enjoyed. Before me as I write is a map of the Bulgarian capital. Sofia has Count Ignatieff Street and Laveleye Street, Boulevard Skobeleff and San Stefano Street, but I see no German or Austrian

names on the map. Germans themselves recognize that their present alliance with Bulgaria, whatever its motive, is certainly not one of love and sentiment.

What is it, then, that commits Bulgaria to the war-aims commonly associated with Prussianism? Is it simply that her troops are fighting alongside German troops? But Bulgaria's entrance into the war on the side of Germany no more commits her to the whole of Germany's program than America's entrance on the side of the Entente commits America to all the aims of the several Entente powers. Is America committed to all that Britain and France aspire to do to Germany, or to the whole program of "Italia irredenta," in Dalmatia and in the Aegean and Asia Minor?

Up to the days of the Russian revolution, America, at war with Germany, was a comrade-in-arms of the Russian Czar; yet who would hold that America was then at one with the spirit of the Romanoffs?

America's public declarations have left little doubt as to her own program, which distinguishes her from some of her allies. And so has Bulgaria declared her own war-program which distinguishes her from her allies. Of that program Bulgaria's whole recent history is a declaration, and ever since the Balkan wars the world has heard nothing else from Sofia: the nullification of the Bucharest Treaty and the liberation and unification of the Bulgarian folk. In the spring of 1915 Bulgaria submitted to Great Britain her terms for joining the Entente: Macedonia, Kavala, Drama, Serres, Bulgarian Dobrudja, Enos-Midia. In August, 1915, the Bulgarian Premier declared:

We will fight for but one end, that is, to extend our frontiers until they embrace the people of our own blood, but that end must be guaranteed us beyond all doubt. If we are asked to fight alone, we are ready. If we are asked to fight with Greece, Servia and Rumania, in a new Balkan alliance on the side of the Allies, our willingness remains the same. To the Allies we say: "Give us back our Macedonia, and we will fight in the way we can serve you best."

Was Bulgaria to blame when Servia, obstinate unto death, refused to yield to the Entente demand that she return to



Bulgaria what in 1912 she had solemnly admitted to be Bulgarian according to the principles of nationality?

Bulgaria's head has not been turned by her recent victories which gave her what her extortioners of 1913 had refused to yield. On several occasions the Sofia government has reiterated that Bulgaria knows her true position in European affairs, is not aspiring to play world-politics, and stands consistently on the same independent national basis.

Britain and Germany-Austria conspired to vivisection San Stefano Bulgaria in 1878, fearing she would become Russia's tool. Bulgaria lived to see the day when Britain repented of her error. May not America help Britain into making the contrary error now, less than forty years after the Berlin Congress, by opposing Bulgaria for fear that she may prove a tool of Germany. Bulgaria is not Germany's tool or Russia's tool: her history since 1878 is one consistent attempt to steer her course Bulgar-wise, between the Scylla of Petersburg and the Charybdis of Vienna and Berlin,—surely an Odyssean task. In 1913 Serbia had an active backer, for Serbia was Russia's own. Bulgaria sought support from Petersburg and from Vienna, in vain, for she was not—and she is not—"trustworthy." The only course Bulgaria can be trusted to follow is the course of her own national destiny. And that destiny spells no danger to Democracy, for itself involves the realization of fundamentally democratic ideals.

To court Bulgaria as a possible active ally of the Entente is futile. Bulgaria would not have allied herself with Germany in 1915, had she then accomplished her national task; now that this task is accomplished, she has no reason for joining the Entente. Aside from this, it should be remembered that in the work of liberating mankind Bulgaria has already done ample service. Since 1912 she has been fighting to rectify monstrous blunders and crimes for which the European Powers, Central and Entente alike, have been largely responsible. All she desires now is the final recognition of her attainment, and the peace to which her moral and military victory entitles her, a peace she ardently desires, but for which she does not have to beg.



A strong, ethnically unified Bulgaria is the surest bulwark that Democracy could possibly desire in the Balkans. Democratic Bulgaria, in this her hour of victory and vindication, has the right to expect the support of democratic America. Bulgarians rely on active sympathy from America; they cannot conceive the possibility of America's waging war on their country. There may be causes which still prevent England and France from approaching Bulgaria; there is no reason why America, which first, at Robert College, taught Bulgaria's young statesmen the ideals of democracy, and which has had no part in Berlin and Bucharest Treaties, should not take the initiative to recognize and thus profit by the one complete victory which Democracy and the principle of Nationality have so far won on the field of battle in this war.